Moreover, there is a trend toward "[elxtensive non-crisis deployment of the Guard [and Reserve that] threatens the nation's foundational dependence on the citizen-soldier."ll Since 1989, there has been a 300% increase in military deployments, in an era that has also seen a 40% decrease in force structure throughout the ~r m~. '~ This has led to significantly increased reliance on reserve components in virtually all deployments, and regular resort to the reserves to relieve the pressure on an overtaxed active component.'3 "This amplified use of the [reserves] for peacetime deployments is hurting recruitment and retention."14 "It may well be that the increased use of the Guard in the post-cold-war world has made it harder to attract people," warned Charles Cragin, Assistant Secretary of Defense. That same concern is echoed by Major Jerry Mendez, a citizen-soldier deployed to Bosnia: "The repercussions are more severe than people think. People are going to have to choose between military service and family. Guess what they are going to choose? That is why the Guard is losing quality "On the other hand, Guard and Reserve personnel have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to meet any challenge [.] " l6 "These citizen-soldiers are great Americans, only too willing to serve their country, and most would be ashamed to question their dep~o~ment."'~ As acknowledged by the Department of Defense,
[tlhe bottom line is that we cannot overuse our reservists without seeing a corresponding increase in attrition and a decline in readiness. In the end, we must strike a balance, so that we create a Total Force that is appropriately sized for missions and staffed with people who want to serve but who do not find the burdens of that service so onerous they leave.''
An Army "Reserve Components Transformation" strategy should also include a reassessment and revision of certain roles and missions of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and A m y Reserve (USAR). Updating and changing roles and missions of its reserve components will better serve "The Army" during and after transformation, in preparing to meet our national security needs in the 21st Century.
Change, of course, is nothing new for the reserve components. Throu'ghout history, change is one of the constants that have helped maintain the essential duality of our American military tradition, with its fundamental reliance on citizen-soldiers.lg Implementation of the Total Force policy, albeit not without some strain between the active and reserve components, is indicative of such change. Debates, past and present, about reserve component roles, and whether we need both an ARNG and USAR, have also helped focus on the importance of the reserves in our military str~cture.~' However, it serves no purpose here to revisit those concerns, skepticisms, or outright parochial interests that have chaffed at the seams of active and reserve relations in the past.2'
Nor, for that matter, is it helpful to re-address issues aired in past efforts to merge portions of the Guard and ~e s e r v e ,~~ or to do away with one or the other component entirely.23 Instead, the suggestions here for a "Reserve Components Transformation" strategy attempt to avoid "stovepipe" arguments that distort a necessary "horizontal" view of issues; in some respects, issues that transcend strictly Army concerns. In a "Reserve Components Transformation" strategy, as in any military transformation strategy,
[glreater emphasis should be placed on experimenting with a variety of military systems, operational concepts, and force structures. The goal would be to identify those that are capable of solving the challenges that emerge or that are capable of exploiting opportunities -our asymmetric advantage -and to eliminate those which are not.24 What is needed now, perhaps more than ever, is a willingness to think bold thoughts and take bold steps, without lingering over sentimentalisms or similar restraints on innovation.
" [E] motion has never led to sound national defense policies -indeed, it has led to the retention of many unsound military policies."25 Moreover, "because the Army as an institution has tended toward gradual evolution rather than more rapid change, the inertia of tradition has been difficult to But,
[elvolution has reached its zenith; the current systems, policies, and programs have given all that they possibly can to the national defense. What is need now is the implementation of revolutionary ideas. To quote former Department of Defense official James L. Gould: "As is true of all large organizations, the Guard and Reserve will achieve their full national defense potential only if opportunities for innovation are periodically and systematically examined. This presupposes an environment in which even 'unthinkable thoughts' are addressed so that innovative proposals, which are once conceptually and practically sound, can be developed for review by senior policy makers.ld7
This paper offers one perspective from which to view a "Reserve Components
Transformation." It is not intended to provide any degree of prescriptive details for the measures suggested; that is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, the intent is that the ideas, even those "out of the box," will engender further honest thinking and discussion.
No doubt many will disagree with the [author's] conclusions; certainly, those conclusions [that] are controversial and politically volatile. Realizing the stakes, however, the disagreement hopefully will foster spirited debate and not blind defensive volleys, and [the author's] contribution will have been to provide food for thought rather than targets for the political rifle range. After all, when we shoot on that range we shoot only at ourselves, and there are no winners. 28 The goal here is that "Army Transformation" move forward in full recognition and consideration of the role of the reserve components in the "The Army."
It is said that there are no new ideas under the sun; we only see them for the first time today. That may be true of this paper. It is an effort to focus . . . on what the writer perceives to be the most critical issues and how to confront them. Let the discussions begin and an agenda be adopted.29
OVERVIEW OF PROPOSED ARMY "RESERVE COMPONENTS TRANSFORMATION"
Despite superficial allure in the idea of merging what at first blush seem to be redundant Army reserve components,30 the ARNG and USAR both have continued efficacy as separate reserve components in the "Reserve Components Transformation" strategy proposed here.
However, there are some significant changes suggested for each.
Various constitutional provisions vest both Congress and the states with power over the National ~uard." As the constitutionally based organized militia32 of the several states, the National Guard has unique "dual-mission" state responsibilities that cannot be met with a "federal" reserve component. Brigades that do not belong to the [active component] counterattack corps4' will make the transition to OBCTs within a 10-year period.
Counterattack corps brigades will make the transition to OBCTs within 15 years.
Army National Guard brigades will make the transition to OBCTs within 21 years.
The six to eight planned interim brigade combat teams will make the transition within 30 years.50
In this "strategy," with the exception of one interim BCT, the ARNG is left out of transformation to the Object Force for up to 30 years -6 years behind transition of the last of the active Legacy Force, and up to 11 years behind transition of the bulk of the active force.
This is the wrong strategy -or no strategy at all -and threatens to leave ARNG combat units behind as a new breed of "hollow force," doggedly preparing to fight the last war, while future war fighting focus is, or should be changing.
The objective should be to have -and no less important, to be seen to have -a decisive edge over any major competitor, most likely China. To remain dominant over China, the United States must not only shift its attention to the Pacific but must also start thinking in entirely new ways about technology, logistics, and operations. For nearly half a century, the American military organized itself to fight a short, extremely intense battle in Europe from large, fixed bases dispersed over relative1 short distances. Whatever a future war in Asia will look like, that will not be it.
5Y
As the Objective Force takes shape, and as active component forces transition, ARNG combat forces should mirror the active force, with a mix of units similarly equipped and trained.
Otherwise, ARNG combat power risks becoming irrelevant. In a major conflict, with active component Objective Forces and ARNG Legacy Forces, combatant commanders will be hard pressed to effectively integrate reserve combat power when and where necessary to sustain and win the fight, and to ensure continued support of the national wi1LS2
mhere is a risk that if the wrong transformation path is chosen (or if no attempt is made at transformation), it will prove difficult, if not impossible, for the Pentagon to buy its way out of mistakes. It is also important to begin the transformation process soon. It is no exaggeration to say that . . 
. the US military 20 years
hence is already being formed and limited by decisions being made today.53
Combat Support and Combat Service Support Units
Today, 63% of the Army's combat support, and'69% of its combat service support is embedded in the reserves. The ARNG and USAR share this responsibility in varying measure.54 However, to streamline transformation support and logistic initiatives, all reserve support functions should be consolidated in the ARNG, except medical services at corps and above, and psychological operations and civil affairs units (discussed below under USAR transforma tion).
. . Current redundancy in support roles has produced duplicative administrative headquarters in the ARNG and USAR. Four Army Reserve Commands, eleven subordinate Regional Support Commands, three Regional Support Groups, and thirty-seven other specialized commandsS5 perform essentially the same functions as State Area Commands, Troop Commands, and other ARNG headquarters. Levels of equipping and training are sometimes disparate, depending upon policies, program emphasis and funding success of the respective components.
These and other problems would be mitigated if the ARNG assumed responsibility for all reserve support functions, with the limited exceptions identified. While this may require provision of some ARNG maintenance and other logistic support for USAR units, which could be accomplished under interservice agreements, a unique force structure for the ARNG and USAR would eliminate or reduce disruptive and unproductive parochialism, and would narrow the issues on reserve component force structure mix, and other hard choices that lie ahead. 56 Perhaps most importantly, consolidation of the reserve support role will enhance "Army Transformation." Development of Object Force doctrine and systems will drive a significant change in the way the Army sustains its war fighting effort. The Chief of Staff has said The Army will "aggressively reduce the size of our deployed support footprints --both combat support and combat service support."57 This transformation in logistics will require not only changes in doctrine and training, but also a "divestment strategy . . . to retire or forego capabilities that are a poor fit . . . and to swap legacy capabilities for transformational ones." 5s All of this is best accomplished under a single component's roof.
Finally, consolidation of the majority of support functions in the ARNG will improve the ability of state governors to respond to natural disasters and domestic disturbances. Personnel and equipment in the USAR are federal assets that are only available when m~bilized.~' In addition, unity of control would enhance unity of effort in utilization of Army reserve component units that are dual missioned to perform homeland security (discussed below under Homeland Security).
Homeland security6'
Defense of America's homeland is the sleeping giant of national security concerns as the 2lSt Century dawns.61 "As one of the most free and open societies in the world, the US is also among the most vulnerable to terr~rism."~~ The security of our society and our citizens must be a primary concern. The emergence of new threats that have both the means and the incentive to strike at our homeland necessitates a heightened degree of readiness by our national security structures to defend against such attacks and to minimize and contain the harm they might cause.63
America's status as the sole remaining superpower, and our policy of engagement world wide, have caused state actors and others disaffected by our actions to resort to asymmetric terrorist attacks on our forces, citizens and property abroad, and increasingly on American citizens and property at home. The 1993 World Trade Center bombing and 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, typical of terrorist attacks of the last decade, were "wanton, indiscriminate acts" designed to achieve their objectives "by killing and maiming as many people as possible."64 "This trend toward more destructive terrorist acts is particularly alarming due to the increasing accessibility of weapons of mass destr~ction."~~ Strategies to guard against such threats, respond to such attacks, and coordinate and control responders, are matters receiving considerable attention around the country, and at the highest levels of Responding agencies will include local, state and federal.
civilian as well as military.
Homeland security is a uniquely appropriate mission for the National Guard. The Guard is a "forward deployed force for responding to domestic disasters," with 3200 armories in 2700 communities around the country.67
In many states, the Adjutant General is also responsible for state emergency management. This "dual hat" is often the key to a timely and effective response. Additionally, the Guard, as a state controlled and directed asset, has the ability to get to the disaster event well before other federal assets could respond. .
. . m h e
Reserves are part of our federal force and do not report to the governors. Some chemical and medical units currently in the USAR may be capable of performing such tasks. However, they are all apportioned to overseas theaters in the event of a major theater war, and remissioning them to focus on homeland security is likely to present an unacceptably high risk to the theater commander.72
The solution is to stand up additional units, or restructure some existing units for these specialized homeland security tasks. There will likely need to be "bill payers," however, as end strength limitations will almost assuredly mean a "zero sum game" in force structure modifications. As support requirements are pared down in response to transformation initiatives, additional force structure may become available for such missions. However, in the interim, tough choices will have to be made -another argument for consolidating the majority of reserve support forces in a single component.
Aging Personnel
A characteristic of all reserve components is that on average their personnel tend to be older than active component personnel. Active units should consist of younger soldiers than are found in the Guard, and they should be fit and ready to go on short notice. Guard units are particularly adapted for heavy forces [that will "follow on" after the "Active Army of light and , medium forces . . . make the entry and establish the lodgment"]. Heavy unit personnel can be older and do not have to meet the physical demands of lighter forces.76
The merits of the contention that personnel in heavy forces need not meet the same physical standards as soldiers in lighter combat forces is questionable. Moreover, as the basis for any policy on future force structure mix between active and reserve combat units it is short sighted at best. It does not take into account that, on whatever transformation timeline it comes to the Guard, the Objective Force will be lighter, and more agile than anything in the heavy forces today -and the physical demands for combat soldiers in the Objective Force will be the same for all components.
The better reasoned argument, supported by some empirical evidence,77 is that soldiers in their forties and fifties, although they are not too old to contribute to the Army, are too old to be counted on to serve effectively in leadership positions in combat units .78 This is not an unmanageable problem, however. Transferring between units, and changing military occupational specialties (MOS) is nothing new in the ~u a r d .~' The 'aging sabers" could transfer to any number of administrative or other noncombatant billets, if and when they are unable to keep up with the "young bucks" in combat units. This would include assignment as "guest" instructors or "subject matter experts" for institutional training conducted by the USAR, as advocated below.
AN ARMY RESERVE "TRANSFORMATION" STRATEGY

Training Units
The USAR has long focused on training readiness as one of its core competencies. While there is a professional military education program to prepare AC personnel for service in joint assignments, a similar program for RC personnel does not exist. As a result, many RC personnel who serve in joint assignments begin those duties less prepared than is desirable. While RC personnel in joint billets do receive some on-the-job training in joint assignments once they arrive, these experiences rarely provide a solid or standardized foundation in the fundamentals of joint operations.85
Joint Medical Service Reserves
"The Army Reserve traces it origins to the creation of the Medical Reserve Corps in 1 9 0 8 . "~~ Today, the USAR has eight medical groups (73% of the Army total), six medical brigades (85% of the Army total), and thirty-one hospitals (77% of the Army total). '' The ARNG has no medical service units at this
Medical services are one of a number of "enablers" of combat power that truly are "service-immaterial." Doctors, nurses, and other health care specialists and technicians perform the same duties regardless of the color of their uniform, or that of their patients.
Medical service reserve capabilities at and above the level of Army corps, Navy fleet, and Air Force wing, should be consolidated into a single, joint reserve force." Medical services at this level will almost invariably be provided in a joint environment. Economies of scale alone support such a move in this highly specialized, professional arena. With little, if any, additional effort, medical service personnel could be cross-trained to deliver their professional skills in any service-centric environment that circumstances might dictate.
Joint Peace Operations Reserve Forces
The trend toward protracted involvement of US military forces in multiple peace operations around the world has been the bane of the active Army, and may ultimately prove to be the While some reserve leaders herald such deployments, and many individual reservists volunteer for such duty, the stress on both employer-employee and family relations threatens to take its toll. 96 Some view this as the harbinger of the demise of the reserves, with a precipitous decline of manpower in the offing.97 Reality is probably not that grim; nevertheless, we should address the problem before any dire consequences befall."
Peace operations run the gamut from peacekeeping on one end of the spectrum, which entails monitoring an established peace between previously combatant factions, to peace enforcement (or peace making) at the other end of the spectrum, where two or more factions are actively engaged in armed conflict, where the object is to bring about a cessation of hostilities by force of arms. Along the spectrum lie variations of the extremes, such as where a peace treaty exists, but some or all of the parties, or factions thereof, have yet to lay down (or have taken back up) their arms.
A successful peace operation often is measured by the ability to create a stable environment, to achieve support for that process by the local population or government, and to assist that population or government to assume control of its own future." Peace enforcement, as described above, is a true military mission, requiring combat forces for successful execution. Even a fractured peace, depending upon the level of hostilities, may require combat forces to restore the peace. The requirements of any particular operation are situation dependant, and likely change as the mission evolves.'00
In any event, when peace is initiated or restored, peace operations usually involve some combination of the following functions:
Monitoring compliance with the terms of peace agreement
Law enforcement (where civil authority is yet to be restored)
Humanitarian assistance, including food, medical support and shelter If it were anticipated that there would be up to three on-going missions at any given time, a total force structure of nine brigades would be needed under the deployment schedule suggested above. Brigades of approximately 2,300 personnel each, counting full-time USAR cadre personnel, could be supported with a 1.5% personnel contribution from each of the four services, or about 2 out of every 134 individual^.'^^ Only one set of equipment would be necessary for any given operation, as rotations could fall in on equipment already in theater.
An active component obligation to support continuing peace operations in this fashion .
would help alleviate operations tempo burdens, and lessen concern over negative impacts on unit war fighting readiness. It would also reduce reserve component concerns over purported ill effects of mobilizations for extended peacekeeping missions.
REVISITING THE FORCE STRUCTURE MIX OF SUPPORT UNITS IN THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE COMPONENTS
The force structure mix in the Army's "Total Force" today is fundamentally flawed when certain essential support functions are embedded heavily, if not exclusively, in the reserve components. The time it takes to mobilize and deploy reserve units is the issue here. This could prove to be a critical detriment to force tailoring for combatant commanders, particularly as "Army Transformation" moves to being able to put a combat brigade on the ground in theater, anywhere in the world, within ninety six hours, a division within five days, and five divisions within thirty days.
The current force structure mismatch is particularly apparent in early enablers of the lodgment phase of any major campaign, such as port handlers in terminal battalions, of which 50% are in the reserves, or air traffic control units, also with nearly 50% in the reserves.'06
Reliance on other units found almost, if not entirely within the reserve components, could also delay early operations, depending upon the threat, the level of conflict, the geopolitical nature of the contingency, the physical or environmental characteristics of the theater or area of operations, or the capabilities of the host nation (if there is one). These types of units include:
Chemical brigades -100% in the reserves
Chemical battalions -75% in the reserves
Water supply battalions -100% in the reserves Petroleum support battalions -92% in the reserves Psychological operations units -81 % in the reserves Civil affairs units -97% in the reserves Public affairs units -82% in the reserve^'^'
The time it takes to make the political decision to call up reserve forces could induce considerable delay, in and of itself. Once that decision is made, the time it takes to mobilize and put a reserve unit in theater varies considerably. A key variable is whether the unit will be transported to the theater by air or sea.
In a study of mobilization and train-up times for Army reserve component support units, the Rand Corporation, using data from Operation Desert Shield, determined that most units could be mobilized, trained and validated for deployment, and at an air port of embarkation within 13 -24 days, depending upon the size of the unit. lo* The availability of airlift assets was not considered in the study, however, and may render illusory predictions of relatively rapid deployment of reserve units by air. As Army combat platforms are lightened to make them air deployable, Air Force strategic lift capabilities will almost certainly be in short supply in the early stages of campaign deployment. Reserve support units may spend as much time waiting at the airport as they did getting there.
The Rand study found that reserve support units deploying by sea could typically have their equipment at the seaport in 18 days, and could complete their training and validation for deployment in 24 -29 days after call-up.'09 Again, this is only the time it takes to get equipment and personnel to the dock, and does not account for the availability of sealift assets, or time in transit.
The mix of active and reserve support units must be reexamined, and readjusted where units critical to the early stages of deployment are overly embedded in the reserves. That force structure analysis, which is beyond the scope of this paper, should be undertaken in consideration of capabilities to perform required mission^."^ A unit unable to get to the theater in a timely fashion, particularly in a little-or no-warning scenario, is not mission capable. The active -reserve force mix should not require commanders to rely on such units for mission accomplishment.
When the "Total Force" policy was implemented in response to the Vietnam experience, it was the Chief of Staff's intent that reservists be integrated so deeply in the force structure that, as a practical matter, no future President would be able to employ any significant military force without calling up the reserves. The 'Total Force" policy was never meant to preclude the President from effectively employing military forces. Interpretation and application of the policy should reflect the realities of the force projection military we have become, rather than the forward deployed military we once were.
IMPLICATIONS OF FISCAL AND MANPOWER RESTRAINTS ON AN ARMY "RESERVE COMPONENTS TRANSFORMATION" STRATEGY
None of the foregoing proposals for an Army "Reserve Components Transformation" strategy were made in light of any detailed consideration of fiscal or end strength impacts. Such analysis would be outside the scope of this paper. However, a working assumption is that any program in the military today, even the ambitious tenets of "Army Transformation," must be I 1 considered in light of "zero-sum" budget and manpower restraints.
I
The new administration may seek higher levels of military funding, as has been suggested, but any increase is likely to be insufficient to make up for current program deficits. I Likewise, the new administration may totally revamp the structure of the Army, along with the rest of the military, "but it would not necessarily be larger.""' Therefore, proposals here requiring increased funding will likely have to compete for limited defense dollars along with other Army programs, and any requiring increased manning will likely have to find their own "bill payers."
Nevertheless, some general observations can be made about these proposals. Transfer of USAR support functions will require transfer of the force structure in those units to the ARNG (with no change to the end strength of the Army reserve components), but should net a surplus of administrative control billets in the USAR. These positions could help "fund" command and control, and cadre requirements for the proposed joint peace operations reserve force, the bulk of the force structure of which will come from "dual missioned" active component soldiers. Only a slight increase in funds would be required for training and equipping this force.
A joint medical services reserve will not require additional manning, and may eliminate some administrative positions service-wide. Economies of scale in joint operations will result in additional savings. The same principles will apply to reduce overall cost of a single reserve component institutional training base under a revamped TASS.
Finally, the proposed specialized homeland security forces will impose some additional funding requirements for equipment and training, and will require additional force structure in the ARNG, at least until there is a draw down in the levels of combat and combat service support in the transition to the Objective Force. Hopefully it will not take a catastrophic WMD incident on American soil to convince Congress to fund such needs.
CONCLUSION
The Army reserve components need a transformation strategy. "Army Transformation"
is underway, with little attention being given in the process to the ARNG or USAR. In order to ensure that "Army Transformation" produces a land force component of the "Total Force" that is relevant, responsive, dominant, and capable of meeting our national security needs in the volatile and uncertain environment of the 21' ' Century, an Army "Reserve Components See, ibid.,28:
Today, the science and technology (S&T) community is working hard to develop answers to questions we have asked: How do we reduce armored volume in combat vehicles while increasing survivability? How do we increase deployability without sacrificing survivability and lethality? How do we reduce in-theater support requirements and thereby reduce demands on strategic lift? These and other questions guide a major S&T effort to develop technologies that will give the Objective Force its desired characteristics --responsiveness, agility, versatility, deployability, lethality, survivability and sustainability.
In the meantime, the Army is working to "validate an organizational and operational model for the Interim Force[,]" ibid, and to find funding for its expensive transformation endeavors.
Given current funding trends, we estimate that The Army has identified funding for approximately half of the additional costs associated with transformation. Today, I declare that we are The Army --totally integrated, with a unity of purpose --no longer the total army, no longer the one army. We are The Army, and we will march into the 21'' century as The Army. We acknowledge our components and their unique strengths. But we are The Army, and will work to structure ourselves accordingly. In practice if not policy, the Army is not one integrated service but three separate entities: the Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve. Each of these components maintains its own separate bureaucracy, each is separately funded, and each has its own parochial interests. [A] smaller active force has led the Army to rely on reserve forces to pick up some of the increased mission load in order to relieve active-force deployment tempo. In striking contrast to Cold War levels of contributory support, today's reserve forces are providing some 12 to 13 million mandays of support to the active component on an annual basis -a thirteen-fold rise and equivalent to the addition of some 35,000 personnel to the active component endstrength, or two Army divisions. 14 Member States should be encouraged, where appropriate, to enter into partnerships with one another, within the context of the United Nations Standby Arrangements Systems (UNSAS), to form several coherent brigade-size forces, with necessary enabling forces, ready for effective deployment within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a traditional peacekeeping operation and within 90 days for complex peacekeeping operations.
